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https://github.com/This-weiyuqing/mi-fitness-health.git
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feat(security): privacy hardening + data export (v0.2.1)
- CORS: default localhost-only origins (was *, allowed any webpage to read local health data cross-site); env override MI_FITNESS_CORS_ORIGINS - Host header allowlist middleware on FastAPI and Flask (DNS-rebinding protection); auto-configured for non-loopback binds via CLI - Move API key passTokens from SQLite plaintext to system keyring, with automatic migration on startup and cleanup for revoked keys - Disable uvicorn access log by default (query params out of terminals) - New GET /api/export: JSON/CSV export of local data (offline, Excel BOM) - Add docs/PRIVACY.md: full data-flow audit, outbound endpoint inventory, threat model, self-verification steps - 6 new tests (host allowlist, keyring roundtrip, CSV)
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@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
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# 运行时环境变量示例(可选;均由服务进程读取,不要把真实值提交进仓库)
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# --- REST API (mi-fitness-mcp api) / Web 仪表盘 (mi-fitness-mcp web) ---
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# 设置后所有数据端点要求 X-API-Key 头
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# 设置后所有数据端点要求 X-API-Key 头(防止本机其他进程/局域网读取健康数据)
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# MI_FITNESS_API_KEY=change-me
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# 管理端点(Key 发放/列表/吊销、扫码登录)要求 X-Admin-Key;未设置时仅限 127.0.0.1 调用
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# MI_FITNESS_ADMIN_KEY=change-me
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# Host 头白名单(防 DNS 重绑定),逗号分隔;非回环绑定时 CLI 会自动设置,一般无需手动配置
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# MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS=127.0.0.1,localhost
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# CORS 来源白名单(默认仅本机来源);如需放开给指定前端才配置,慎用 *
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# MI_FITNESS_CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:3000
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# --- Web 仪表盘 (mi-fitness-mcp web) ---
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# MI_FITNESS_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8321 # 反向代理的后端 FastAPI 地址
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@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
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# Changelog
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## 0.2.1(隐私加固)
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- 数据安全审计文档 `docs/PRIVACY.md`:全部对外请求清单(仅小米域名)、本机数据存放表、威胁模型与自验方法
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- CORS 收紧:默认仅允许本机来源(原来为 `*`,恶意网页可跨站读取本地健康数据);可用 `MI_FITNESS_CORS_ORIGINS` 覆盖
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- Host 头白名单中间件(FastAPI + Flask 双侧):阻断 DNS 重绑定攻击;非回环绑定时 CLI 自动放行绑定地址,可用 `MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS` 覆盖
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- API Key 的 passToken 迁出 SQLite 明文,改存系统 keyring(启动时自动迁移历史数据);吊销时同步清理
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- `api` 命令默认关闭 uvicorn 访问日志(查询参数不再落入终端)
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- 新增 `GET /api/export`:本地数据导出为 JSON/CSV(含 Excel BOM),纯离线操作
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## 0.2.0
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- 内置 Web 仪表盘(`mi-fitness-mcp web`,Flask):可视化测试全部 API 端点、Key 管理、扫码登录,内置反向代理(自动附加 X-API-Key/X-Admin-Key,上游耗时透传)
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@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ tests/ # 单元测试与端到端测试套件
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## 文档
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- [隐私与数据安全审计](docs/PRIVACY.md) —— 数据流向、全部对外请求清单、威胁模型与自验方法
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- [完整技术文档](docs/PROJECT_DOCUMENTATION.md) —— 架构、小米云协议逆向细节、存储模型、19 条已知问题清单与重构指南
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- [扫码登录实现方案](docs/QR_LOGIN.md) —— 协议时序、端点参数、踩坑记录(`sid=xiaomiio`)
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- [贡献指南](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [安全政策](SECURITY.md) · [更新日志](CHANGELOG.md)
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@@ -198,11 +199,14 @@ pytest -v # 完整测试套件(22 个)
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python -m build # 构建发行包
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```
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## 安全说明
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## 安全与隐私
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**数据只进不出**:本项目从小米云拉取你自己的数据到本地 SQLite,除小米官方服务器外不与任何第三方通信;无遥测/统计/崩溃上报;所有查询端点断网可用。完整审计见 [docs/PRIVACY.md](docs/PRIVACY.md)。
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- `passToken` 等同小米账号登录态,**切勿提交或泄露**;若泄露,请在小米账号安全中心退出设备并重新登录
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- 凭据与 API Key 密钥存于系统 keyring(Windows DPAPI / macOS Keychain / Linux Secret Service),不落明文
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- 不要提交本地配置、数据库、keyring 文件(`.gitignore` 已默认排除)
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- 服务默认仅绑定 `127.0.0.1`。向局域网/公网开放前,务必设置 `MI_FITNESS_API_KEY` 与 `MI_FITNESS_ADMIN_KEY`——健康数据是敏感信息
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- 服务默认仅绑定 `127.0.0.1`,并已启用 CORS 本机限制与 Host 白名单(防恶意网页跨站读取 / DNS 重绑定)。向局域网/公网开放前,务必设置 `MI_FITNESS_API_KEY` 与 `MI_FITNESS_ADMIN_KEY`——健康数据是敏感信息
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- 扫码登录端点允许扫码者将其账号登录到你的服务器,务必保持管理鉴权开启
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## 免责声明
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
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# 隐私与数据安全审计
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> 本文回答一个问题:**我的健康数据到底去了哪里?**
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> 结论先行:本项目是"拉取式"本地工具——数据只从小米云**下载**到你的电脑,除小米自己的服务器外**不上传到任何第三方**;无遥测、无统计、无崩溃上报;查询功能完全离线可用。
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---
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## 1. 数据流向总览
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```
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小米手环/手表 ──蓝牙──> 小米运动健康 App ──> 小米健康云(小米官方,与本项目无关)
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│
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│ ① 拉取(登录 + 分页下载,RC4 加密通道)
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▼
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┌──────────── 本项目(你的电脑)────────────┐
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│ SQLite(健康数据) │
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│ 系统 keyring(passToken / API Key 密钥) │
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│ config.json(无敏感信息) │
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└───────────────────────────────────────────┘
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│ ② 读取(纯本地,断网可用)
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├──> MCP 客户端(stdio,本机进程)
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├──> REST API(默认 127.0.0.1)
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└──> Web 仪表盘(默认 127.0.0.1)
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```
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**唯一出网的方向是 ①:从小米云拉你自己的数据。** 没有任何"上传健康数据"的代码路径。
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## 2. 全部对外网络请求清单(代码审计)
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对 `src/` 全量 grep `https://` 的结果,所有外联域名均属小米:
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| 端点 | 用途 | 方向 |
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|---|---|---|
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| `https://account.xiaomi.com/pass/serviceLogin` | passToken 换服务会话 | 请求小米 |
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| `https://account.xiaomi.com/longPolling/loginUrl` | 扫码登录:生成二维码会话 | 请求小米 |
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| `https://hlth.io.mi.com` / `https://{region}.hlth.io.mi.com` | 健康数据分页拉取 | 请求小米 |
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| `https://sts.api.io.mi.com/sts` | 仅作为扫码接口的 callback **参数**(小米校验用),本项目不请求它 | — |
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| `https://127.0.0.1:8321` | Web 仪表盘反代到本机 API | 仅本机 |
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扫码登录流程中由**小米动态下发**的跳转地址(`c3.account.xiaomi.com`、`c3.lp.account.xiaomi.com` 等)也全部位于 `*.xiaomi.com` 小米域名下。
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**不存在**:遥测(telemetry)、统计(analytics)、Sentry/PostHog/Mixpanel 等上报 SDK、GitHub star 上报、版本检查回传、任何第三方域名。可用以下命令自行复核:
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```bash
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grep -rn "https\?://" src/ --include="*.py" | grep -v 127.0.0.1 # 应只见 *.xiaomi.com / *.io.mi.com
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grep -rniE "telemetry|analytics|sentry|posthog|mixpanel" src/ # 应无结果
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```
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## 3. 数据在本机的存放位置
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| 数据 | 位置 | 保护 |
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|---|---|---|
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| 健康数据(8 类) | `<用户数据目录>/mi-fitness-mcp/mi_fitness.db`(SQLite) | 本机文件权限;不上传 |
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| 小米 passToken(setup 凭据) | 系统 keyring(Windows: DPAPI 加密 / macOS: Keychain / Linux: Secret Service) | OS 级加密 |
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| API Key 对应的 passToken | 系统 keyring(v0.2.1 起;旧版本曾存 SQLite 明文,启动时自动迁移并清空) | OS 级加密 |
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| `mif_sk_*` Key 本身、user_id、region、发放/使用时间 | SQLite `api_keys` 表 | 无秘密性要求(可吊销) |
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| 配置 | `<用户配置目录>/mi-fitness-mcp/config.json` | 不含凭据 |
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| 仓库内 | 无任何上述文件(`.gitignore` 排除 `.venv/ *.db .env config.json` 等) | — |
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## 4. 本地暴露面与防护(v0.2.1 加固)
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数据"不上传"之外,还要防**被动窃取**。本项目默认只绑 `127.0.0.1`,针对本机攻击面的防护:
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| 威胁 | 场景 | 防护 |
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|---|---|---|
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| 恶意网页跨站读取 | 你浏览器里开着的任意网页用 JS 请求 `http://127.0.0.1:8321` 并读取响应 | CORS 默认只允许 `localhost/127.0.0.1/[::1]` 来源(正则限定,任意端口),其他域名一律无 CORS 头,浏览器阻止读取 |
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| DNS 重绑定 | 攻击者域名解析到 127.0.0.1 绕过同源策略 | **Host 头白名单中间件**(FastAPI 与 Flask 双侧):Host 非本机域名直接 403 |
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| 本机其他进程读取 | 同机运行的任何程序请求本地 API | 设置环境变量 `MI_FITNESS_API_KEY` 强制鉴权;管理端点默认仅本机且可设 `MI_FITNESS_ADMIN_KEY` |
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| 凭据落盘明文 | SQLite 被复制/同步盘上传 | passToken 全部走系统 keyring;`api_keys` 表启动时自动迁移历史明文并清空 |
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| 日志泄密 | 终端/日志文件留下查询参数(日期等) | `api` 命令默认关闭 uvicorn 访问日志 |
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| 扫码端点滥用 | 他人把他的账号"登录"到你的服务器 | 扫码/Key 管理端点要求 `X-Admin-Key`(未设则仅限 127.0.0.1) |
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环境变量开关(见 `.env.example`):`MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS`(Host 白名单,非回环绑定时 CLI 自动设置)、`MI_FITNESS_CORS_ORIGINS`(显式放开跨域来源,慎用 `*`)。
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## 5. 如何自行验证
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1. **断网测试**:拔网线后所有查询端点、`/api/export`、Web 仪表盘图表照常工作(同步/扫码会失败,属预期)——证明查询链路纯本地。
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2. **抓包**:`netstat`/Wireshark 观察进程外联,目标应只有 `*.xiaomi.com` / `*.io.mi.com`。
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3. **代码审计**:第 2 节的两条 grep 命令;全部网络代码集中在 `adapters/mi_fitness_cloud.py`、`api.py`(扫码)、`web.py`(本机反代)。
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4. **仓库审计**:`git ls-files | grep -iE "\.db|\.sqlite|config\.json|\.env$"` 应无结果。
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## 6. 明确不做的事
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- ❌ 不上传、不转发、不备份健康数据到任何第三方服务
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- ❌ 不内置任何遥测、统计、崩溃上报
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- ❌ 不在代码仓库或文档中存放任何凭据
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- ❌ 不写入小米账号(全协议只读;唯一"写"是登录换 token,属认证必需)
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## 7. 边界说明(与本项目无关的上传)
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- 手环 → 小米云的上传由**小米官方 App**完成,这是设备生态本身的行为;本项目只读取。介意者请在小米 App 内管理同步策略。
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- 你若把 SQLite 文件自行放进网盘/同步盘,属于你自己的操作,请自行加密。
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+1
-1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
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[project]
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name = "mi-fitness-mcp"
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version = "0.2.0"
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version = "0.2.1"
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description = "MCP server for Mi Fitness data access"
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readme = "README.md"
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license = {text = "MIT"}
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+136
-5
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import uuid
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from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from datetime import UTC, datetime
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from typing import Annotated
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from typing import Annotated, Any
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import httpx
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from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Header, HTTPException, Query, Request
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@@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
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from mi_fitness_mcp.adapters.mi_fitness_cloud import MiFitnessCloudAdapter
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from mi_fitness_mcp.auth import load_mi_fitness_token
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from mi_fitness_mcp.config import load_config
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from mi_fitness_mcp.security import (
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cors_origins_from_env,
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default_allowed_hosts,
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delete_api_key_secret,
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host_allowed,
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load_api_key_secret,
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store_api_key_secret,
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)
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from mi_fitness_mcp.services.query_service import QueryService
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from mi_fitness_mcp.services.sync_service import SyncService
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from mi_fitness_mcp.storage import Database
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@@ -112,7 +120,20 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
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)
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"""
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)
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# 迁移:历史版本把 passToken 明文存在该表,启动时移入系统 keyring 并清空列
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legacy = conn.execute(
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"SELECT key, pass_token FROM api_keys WHERE pass_token != ''"
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).fetchall()
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for row in legacy:
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if store_api_key_secret(row["key"], row["pass_token"]):
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conn.execute("UPDATE api_keys SET pass_token = '' WHERE key = ?", (row["key"],))
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# 已吊销 Key 的 keyring 密钥一并清理(历史版本吊销时尚无 keyring 概念)
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revoked_keys = [
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r["key"] for r in conn.execute("SELECT key FROM api_keys WHERE revoked = 1").fetchall()
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]
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conn.commit()
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for k in revoked_keys:
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delete_api_key_secret(k)
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default_context = None
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if config.mode == "mi_fitness_cloud":
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@@ -163,16 +184,53 @@ async def _gate(x_api_key: str | None = Header(default=None)) -> None:
|
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|
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app = FastAPI(
|
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title="Mi Fitness API",
|
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version="0.2.0",
|
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version="0.2.1",
|
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description="小米运动健康数据 REST API(多 Key 鉴权 + 扫码登录 + 本地 SQLite 缓存)",
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lifespan=lifespan,
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dependencies=[Depends(_gate)],
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)
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app.add_middleware(
|
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CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=["*"], allow_methods=["*"], allow_headers=["*"]
|
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CORSMiddleware,
|
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allow_methods=["*"],
|
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allow_headers=["*"],
|
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**cors_origins_from_env(default_regex=r"^https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?$"),
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)
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class HostAllowlistMiddleware:
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"""Host 头白名单(防 DNS 重绑定):拒绝非本机域名直连本地端口读取数据。"""
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||||
|
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def __init__(self, app, allowed_hosts: set[str] | None = None):
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self.app = app
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self.allowed_hosts = allowed_hosts if allowed_hosts is not None else default_allowed_hosts()
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async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
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if scope["type"] == "http":
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host = ""
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for name, value in scope.get("headers", []):
|
||||
if name == b"host":
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host = value.decode("latin-1")
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break
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if not host_allowed(host, self.allowed_hosts):
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body = b'{"detail": "Host not allowed"}'
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await send(
|
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{
|
||||
"type": "http.response.start",
|
||||
"status": 403,
|
||||
"headers": [
|
||||
(b"content-type", b"application/json"),
|
||||
(b"content-length", str(len(body)).encode()),
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": body})
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return
|
||||
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
|
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|
||||
|
||||
app.add_middleware(HostAllowlistMiddleware)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _resolve_context(request: Request) -> UserContext:
|
||||
"""根据 X-API-Key 解析出对应用户上下文;静态 Key/无头 → 默认凭据。"""
|
||||
state = request.app.state
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||||
@@ -186,7 +244,11 @@ def _resolve_context(request: Request) -> UserContext:
|
||||
(header,),
|
||||
).fetchone()
|
||||
if row is not None:
|
||||
cache_key = (row["user_id"], row["pass_token"], row["region"])
|
||||
# passToken 优先从系统 keyring 读取;为空则回退 DB 列(无 keyring 环境的降级存储)
|
||||
pass_token = load_api_key_secret(header) or row["pass_token"]
|
||||
if not pass_token:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="API key credentials unavailable")
|
||||
cache_key = (row["user_id"], pass_token, row["region"])
|
||||
ctx = state.contexts.get(cache_key)
|
||||
if ctx is None:
|
||||
ctx = _build_context(state.db, state.config, *cache_key)
|
||||
@@ -249,10 +311,12 @@ class CreateKeyRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
|
||||
def _create_key_record(db: Database, user_id: str, pass_token: str, region: str, label: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
key = "mif_sk_" + secrets.token_hex(20)
|
||||
# passToken 存系统 keyring(加密);keyring 不可用才降级写 DB 明文列
|
||||
stored = store_api_key_secret(key, pass_token)
|
||||
with db._get_connection() as conn:
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"INSERT INTO api_keys (key, label, user_id, pass_token, region, created_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
|
||||
(key, label, user_id, pass_token, region, datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()),
|
||||
(key, label, user_id, "" if stored else pass_token, region, datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
return key
|
||||
@@ -322,6 +386,7 @@ async def revoke_key(key_prefix: str, request: Request) -> dict:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="没有匹配的 Key(可用完整 Key 或唯一前缀)")
|
||||
for k in matches:
|
||||
conn.execute("UPDATE api_keys SET revoked = 1 WHERE key = ?", (k,))
|
||||
delete_api_key_secret(k)
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
return {"status": "ok", "revoked": matches}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -761,3 +826,69 @@ def get_coverage(
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
data = _query_service(request).get_data_coverage(data_types)
|
||||
return {"status": "ok", "count": len(data), "data": data}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _to_csv(rows: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> str:
|
||||
"""把查询结果扁平化为 CSV(嵌套结构转 JSON 字符串,加 BOM 便于 Excel 打开中文)。"""
|
||||
import csv
|
||||
import io
|
||||
|
||||
fieldnames: list[str] = []
|
||||
for row in rows:
|
||||
for name in row:
|
||||
if name not in fieldnames:
|
||||
fieldnames.append(name)
|
||||
buf = io.StringIO()
|
||||
writer = csv.DictWriter(buf, fieldnames=fieldnames, extrasaction="ignore")
|
||||
writer.writeheader()
|
||||
for row in rows:
|
||||
writer.writerow(
|
||||
{
|
||||
k: (json.dumps(v, ensure_ascii=False) if isinstance(v, (list, dict)) else v)
|
||||
for k, v in row.items()
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
return "\ufeff" + buf.getvalue()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
EXPORT_SOURCES = {
|
||||
"daily_activity": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_daily_summaries(s, e),
|
||||
"heart_rate": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_heart_rate_samples(s, e),
|
||||
"sleep": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_sleep_sessions(s, e),
|
||||
"workouts": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_workouts(s, e),
|
||||
"body_measurements": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_body_measurements(s, e),
|
||||
"spo2": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_spo2_samples(s, e),
|
||||
"stress": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_stress_samples(s, e),
|
||||
"abnormal_heart_beat": lambda qs, s, e: qs.get_abnormal_heart_beat_events(s, e),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@app.get("/api/export", response_model=None)
|
||||
def export_data(
|
||||
request: Request,
|
||||
data_type: str,
|
||||
start_date: str,
|
||||
end_date: str,
|
||||
format: str = "json",
|
||||
) -> Response | dict:
|
||||
"""导出本地数据(JSON 或 CSV)。仅读本地 SQLite,不触发任何网络请求。"""
|
||||
if data_type not in EXPORT_SOURCES:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"data_type 必须是 {sorted(EXPORT_SOURCES)} 之一")
|
||||
if format not in ("json", "csv"):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="format 必须是 json 或 csv")
|
||||
data = EXPORT_SOURCES[data_type](
|
||||
_query_service(request),
|
||||
_validate_date(start_date, "start_date"),
|
||||
_validate_date(end_date, "end_date"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if format == "csv":
|
||||
return Response(
|
||||
content=_to_csv(data),
|
||||
media_type="text/csv; charset=utf-8",
|
||||
headers={
|
||||
"Content-Disposition": (
|
||||
f'attachment; filename="mi_fitness_{data_type}_{start_date}_{end_date}.csv"'
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"status": "ok", "count": len(data), "data": data}
|
||||
@@ -149,15 +149,24 @@ def cmd_api(args):
|
||||
|
||||
import uvicorn
|
||||
|
||||
if args.host not in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost") and not os.environ.get("MI_FITNESS_API_KEY"):
|
||||
print("⚠️ 绑定到非本机地址但未设置 MI_FITNESS_API_KEY,健康数据将暴露给局域网。")
|
||||
print(" 建议先设置环境变量 MI_FITNESS_API_KEY 再启动。")
|
||||
uvicorn.run("mi_fitness_mcp.api:app", host=args.host, port=args.port)
|
||||
loopback = ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1")
|
||||
if args.host not in loopback:
|
||||
# 非回环绑定:Host 白名单放行该地址(默认仅本机域名,见 security.py)
|
||||
os.environ.setdefault("MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS", args.host)
|
||||
if not os.environ.get("MI_FITNESS_API_KEY"):
|
||||
print("⚠️ 绑定到非本机地址但未设置 MI_FITNESS_API_KEY,健康数据将暴露给局域网。")
|
||||
print(" 建议先设置环境变量 MI_FITNESS_API_KEY 再启动。")
|
||||
# 关闭访问日志:查询串中的日期等参数不再落入终端/日志
|
||||
uvicorn.run("mi_fitness_mcp.api:app", host=args.host, port=args.port, access_log=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cmd_web(args):
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
from mi_fitness_mcp.web import run_server
|
||||
|
||||
if args.host not in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"):
|
||||
os.environ.setdefault("MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS", args.host)
|
||||
run_server(
|
||||
host=args.host,
|
||||
port=args.port,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
"""本地安全加固工具:Host 校验、CORS 解析与 API Key 密钥的 keyring 存取。
|
||||
|
||||
设计目标(见 docs/PRIVACY.md):
|
||||
- 浏览器中的恶意网页无法读取本地 API 的健康数据(CORS 默认仅本机来源);
|
||||
- DNS 重绑定攻击无法绕过同源策略(Host 头白名单);
|
||||
- 发放的 API Key 对应的 passToken 不落 SQLite 明文,存入系统 keyring
|
||||
(Windows DPAPI / macOS Keychain / Linux Secret Service),keyring 不可用时
|
||||
才回退到数据库列并保持兼容。
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
SERVICE_NAME = "mi-fitness-mcp"
|
||||
|
||||
LOOPBACK_HOSTS = {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "[::1]"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_allowed_hosts() -> set[str]:
|
||||
"""Host 白名单。默认仅本机回环;环境变量 MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS 可覆盖(逗号分隔,* 放行全部)。"""
|
||||
env = os.environ.get("MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS")
|
||||
if env:
|
||||
return {h.strip().lower() for h in env.split(",") if h.strip()}
|
||||
return set(LOOPBACK_HOSTS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def host_allowed(host: str | None, allowed_hosts: set[str]) -> bool:
|
||||
"""校验请求 Host 头是否在白名单内(自动剥离端口,支持 IPv6 方括号写法)。"""
|
||||
if "*" in allowed_hosts:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if not host:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
h = host.strip().lower()
|
||||
if h.startswith("["):
|
||||
end = h.find("]")
|
||||
if end != -1:
|
||||
h = h[: end + 1]
|
||||
elif ":" in h:
|
||||
h = h.rsplit(":", 1)[0]
|
||||
return h in allowed_hosts
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cors_origins_from_env(default_regex: str) -> dict:
|
||||
"""CORS 配置:环境变量 MI_FITNESS_CORS_ORIGINS 提供精确来源列表,否则用本机正则默认值。"""
|
||||
env = os.environ.get("MI_FITNESS_CORS_ORIGINS")
|
||||
if env:
|
||||
origins = [o.strip() for o in env.split(",") if o.strip()]
|
||||
if origins:
|
||||
return {"allow_origins": origins}
|
||||
return {"allow_origin_regex": default_regex}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _account_for(api_key: str) -> str:
|
||||
digest = hashlib.sha256(api_key.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
|
||||
return f"apikey_{digest}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def store_api_key_secret(api_key: str, pass_token: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""把 API Key 对应的 passToken 存入系统 keyring。返回是否成功。"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import keyring
|
||||
|
||||
keyring.set_password(SERVICE_NAME, _account_for(api_key), pass_token)
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_api_key_secret(api_key: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import keyring
|
||||
|
||||
return keyring.get_password(SERVICE_NAME, _account_for(api_key))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def delete_api_key_secret(api_key: str) -> None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import keyring
|
||||
|
||||
keyring.delete_password(SERVICE_NAME, _account_for(api_key))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ from flask import (
|
||||
send_from_directory,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
from mi_fitness_mcp.security import default_allowed_hosts, host_allowed
|
||||
|
||||
# Assets directory: src/mi_fitness_mcp/web_assets or fallback to testpage
|
||||
PACKAGE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
|
||||
DEFAULT_ASSETS_DIR = PACKAGE_DIR / "web_assets"
|
||||
@@ -55,6 +57,13 @@ def create_app(
|
||||
# Persistent HTTP client with 300s timeout (trust_env=False avoids proxy interference on localhost)
|
||||
http_client = httpx.Client(trust_env=False, timeout=300.0, follow_redirects=True)
|
||||
|
||||
@app.before_request
|
||||
def _check_host():
|
||||
# Host 头白名单(防 DNS 重绑定):默认仅本机域名,环境变量可覆盖
|
||||
if not host_allowed(request.host, default_allowed_hosts()):
|
||||
return jsonify({"detail": "Host not allowed"}), 403
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
@app.route("/")
|
||||
def index():
|
||||
"""Render the main dashboard interface."""
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for local security hardening (host allowlist, CORS, keyring secrets, CSV export)."""
|
||||
|
||||
import keyring
|
||||
|
||||
from mi_fitness_mcp.api import _to_csv
|
||||
from mi_fitness_mcp.security import (
|
||||
default_allowed_hosts,
|
||||
delete_api_key_secret,
|
||||
host_allowed,
|
||||
load_api_key_secret,
|
||||
store_api_key_secret,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_host_allowed_strips_ports():
|
||||
allowed = default_allowed_hosts()
|
||||
assert host_allowed("127.0.0.1:8321", allowed)
|
||||
assert host_allowed("localhost:9999", allowed)
|
||||
assert host_allowed("LOCALHOST", allowed)
|
||||
assert host_allowed("[::1]:8321", allowed)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_host_allowed_rejects_foreign_domains():
|
||||
allowed = default_allowed_hosts()
|
||||
# DNS 重绑定场景:外部域名解析到 127.0.0.1,但 Host 头仍是外部域名
|
||||
assert not host_allowed("evil.example.com", allowed)
|
||||
assert not host_allowed("evil.example.com:8321", allowed)
|
||||
assert not host_allowed(None, allowed)
|
||||
assert not host_allowed("", allowed)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_host_allowed_env_override():
|
||||
# monkeypatch env via keyring-free approach: direct set check
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
old = os.environ.get("MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.environ["MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS"] = "lanhost.local,*"
|
||||
allowed = default_allowed_hosts()
|
||||
assert host_allowed("lanhost.local:8321", allowed)
|
||||
assert host_allowed("anything.com", allowed) # * 放行
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
if old is None:
|
||||
os.environ.pop("MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS", None)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
os.environ["MI_FITNESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS"] = old
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_api_key_secret_roundtrip(monkeypatch):
|
||||
store = {}
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(keyring, "set_password", lambda s, a, v: store.__setitem__((s, a), v))
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(keyring, "get_password", lambda s, a: store.get((s, a)))
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
keyring,
|
||||
"delete_password",
|
||||
lambda s, a: store.pop((s, a), None),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
api_key = "mif_sk_" + "a" * 40
|
||||
assert store_api_key_secret(api_key, "V1:secret-token")
|
||||
assert load_api_key_secret(api_key) == "V1:secret-token"
|
||||
# 不同 Key 的存储隔离(账号名含 key 哈希)
|
||||
other = "mif_sk_" + "b" * 40
|
||||
assert load_api_key_secret(other) is None
|
||||
delete_api_key_secret(api_key)
|
||||
assert load_api_key_secret(api_key) is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_store_api_key_secret_keyring_failure(monkeypatch):
|
||||
def boom(_s, _a, _v):
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("no keyring backend")
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(keyring, "set_password", boom)
|
||||
assert not store_api_key_secret("mif_sk_x", "tok")
|
||||
assert load_api_key_secret("mif_sk_x") is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_to_csv_flattens_and_adds_bom():
|
||||
rows = [
|
||||
{"date": "2026-08-30", "steps": 100, "stages": [{"stage": "deep", "minutes": 60}]},
|
||||
{"date": "2026-08-31", "steps": None, "stages": []},
|
||||
]
|
||||
csv_text = _to_csv(rows)
|
||||
assert csv_text.startswith("\ufeff")
|
||||
assert "date,steps,stages" in csv_text
|
||||
# CSV 规范内层引号转义为两个引号
|
||||
assert '"[{""stage"": ""deep"", ""minutes"": 60}]"' in csv_text
|
||||
assert "2026-08-31" in csv_text
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user